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In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking—the provision of financial services
and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank
intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds—is so radically transforming
finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions.  This Article attempts to
rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liabil-
ity limited to the capital they have invested.  In the relatively small and decentralized firms that
dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers.  Limited liability gives
these investor-managers strong incentives to take risks that could generate outsized personal prof-
its, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.  For shadow banking firms subject to this conflict,
limited liability should be redesigned to better align investor and societal interests.
INTRODUCTION
In a prior article, I argued that shadow banking is so radically transform-
ing finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions.1
In this Article, I argue that the governance structure of shadow banking
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should be redesigned to make certain investors financially responsible, by
reason of their ownership interests, for their firm’s liabilities beyond the capi-
tal they have invested.2  This argument challenges the longstanding assump-
tion of the optimality of limited liability.
Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to the decentralized provision
of financing outside of traditional banking channels, and thus it is without
the need for traditional modes of bank intermediation between capital mar-
kets and the users of funds.3  The shadow banking system is immense,
recently estimated at sixty-seven trillion dollars worldwide.4  Numerous types
of firms make up the shadow banking system.  They include special purpose
entities (SPEs), used in securitization and structured finance transactions to
raise financing indirectly through the capital markets,5 as well as finance
companies, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, nonbank government-
sponsored enterprises, securities lenders, and investment banks.6
Limited liability, this Article contends, is not always optimal for firms
that make up the shadow banking system (hereinafter “shadow banking
firms”).  Limited liability can sometimes make the governance structure of
these firms uniquely subject to a market failure that externalizes the systemic
costs of taking a risky action.  To repair this failure, managers of shadow
2 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (9th ed. 2009) (defining limited liability as the
“liability of a company’s owners for nothing more than the capital they have invested in the
business”).
3 See FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING THE OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING 1 (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1204
20c.pdf (describing the shadow banking system as “credit intermediation involving entities
and activities outside the regular banking system” (citation omitted)).  Shadow banking is
sometimes alternatively defined as the provision of financing by any type of financial inter-
mediary that operates without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guar-
antees. TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO.
559, SHADOW BANKING REGULATION 2 (2012).  For additional background on shadow bank-
ing, see id.; Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugu-
ral Symposium of The Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619
(2012); Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins (Jan. 24, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=199
0816.
4 FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 3 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating
shadow banking’s worldwide assets in 2011); cf. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 4–5 (rev. 2012), http://www.newyorkfed
.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (arguing that shadow bank financing appears to
dwarf traditional bank financing).
5 See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 621.  These SPEs include asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP), conduits, and structured investment vehicles (commonly known as “SIVs”).
Id.
6 Banks themselves can be regarded as shadow banking firms to the extent they facili-
tate customer financing in an agency capacity, as opposed to making loans or otherwise
extending credit to their customers.  For example, banks often create SPEs, ABCP con-
duits, and SIVs.  Banks also are important players in repo markets. Id. at 621–22.
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banking firms should sometimes be required to put more “skin in the game,”
in order to better align incentives7 between their firms and society.8
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, the Article sets forth the back-
ground for its analysis, including a short history of how corporate limited
liability became the norm and an overview of the general academic debate
on whether it should be the norm.  In Part II, the Article analyzes whether
limited liability should be the norm for the governance structure of shadow
banking.  The Article starts that analysis by proposing a normative framework
for rethinking the corporate governance assumptions about limited liability.
It then applies that framework to shadow banking.  Although limited liability
has always been a potential source of externalities, the Article finds that it is a
uniquely fertile source of systemic externalities for shadow banking firms,
and that current law does not—nor are adaptations to traditional legal reme-
dies likely to—adequately internalize those externalities.  To mitigate those
externalities, limited liability should be redesigned for shadow banking firms
that are governed by conflicted investor-managers.  Part III of the Article
explores how limited liability could be redesigned, establishing goals for the
redesign and testing redesign proposals against those goals.  Annex I to the
Article provides practical guidance for assessing the costs and benefits of any
particular redesign.
This Article does not directly engage whether—or the extent to which—
shadow banking should be subject to substantive capital and solvency regula-
tion, or even prohibited.  As to the first, it has not historically been custom-
ary, at least in the United States, to engage in solvency regulation of firms
that are not traditional banks.9  The Dodd-Frank Act is beginning to change
that, with its regulation of certain systemically important financial institu-
tions.10  Nonetheless, even though the limited-liability rule of corporation
law can cause externalities, the government does not generally “take a more
active role in assuring the solvency of corporations.”11  In part, this is because
government micromanagement of the private sector is not always efficient.12
Likewise, it might well be unwise to attempt to prohibit shadow banking.
Even if that were feasible, shadow banking “has the potential to create both
benefit and harm.  Empirically, we do not yet know which effect is likely to
7 Cf. Eugene N. White, Rethinking the Regulation of Banking: Choices or Incentives?
2 (Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that bank regu-
latory “reform should focus on changing the incentives that parties face to insure that they
are correctly aligned to induce the development of less fragile institutions”).
8 See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 635–36.  This Article does not argue that such manag-
ers necessarily have conflicts with their firms.  I have separately argued, however, that cer-
tain managers, especially secondary or middle managers, may well have such conflicts. See
Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management
Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 458–59 (2009).
9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 413–14 (6th ed. 2003).
10 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
11 POSNER, supra note 9, at 413.
12 Id. at 413–14 (describing the “continuous regulatory scrutiny” of an agency as a
“statist” solution with only “arguabl[y]” positive benefits).
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dominate.”13  Therefore, “financial regulation of shadow banking should . . .
strive to examine . . . how to mitigate the potential harm while preserving the
potential benefit.”14  That is this Article’s goal.
I. BACKGROUND
As background for this Article’s analysis of limited liability in the context
of shadow banking, the discussion begins by examining, from a historical
standpoint, how corporate limited liability became the general norm and
then, from a scholarly standpoint, whether it should be the general norm.
A. History of Limited Liability
Limited liability has been called “a distinguishing feature of corporate
law—perhaps the distinguishing feature” of corporate law.15  Yet early corpo-
rations did not have limited liability.  Because their histories are different,
first consider the evolution of limited liability for shareholders of nonbank
corporations, then consider that evolution for shareholders of banks.  Finally,
compare these with the evolution of limited liability outside the United
States.
1. Nonbank Corporations
During the early nineteenth century, for example, unlimited share-
holder liability was the norm.16  The rationale for such unlimited liability was
that creditors assured of repayment from shareholders would lend the corpo-
ration additional capital.17  Indirect shareholder liability, which resulted
from the corporate power to make assessments, was also a common feature of
early nineteenth-century corporations.18
13 Steven L. Schwarcz, Framing Address: A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market Trans-
formation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299, 305 (2013).
14 Id.
15 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COR-
PORATE LAW 40 (1991).
16 Corporate charters in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York all
provided for direct and unlimited shareholder liability. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited
Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 588 (1986).  Corporate charters in Maine,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island contained an express provision that shareholders would
be fully liable.  Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2002).  Even with the rise of manufacturing
companies in New England states, early corporate charters and statutes imposed direct
liability on shareholders.  Blumberg, supra, at 591.  For a discussion of the historical foun-
dations of limited liability prior to the nineteenth century, see Robert W. Hillman, New
Forms and New Balances: Organizing the External Relations of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 613 (1997).
17 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1210.
18 See Blumberg, supra note 16, at 590–91; E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited
Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1356–57 (1948).
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Legislators initially were willing to allow corporations performing public
functions, such as operating turnpikes, toll bridges, and canals, to organize
under corporate charters with limited shareholder liability.19  But they were
unwilling to permit limited liability for shareholders of manufacturing corpo-
rations.20  The movement toward general limited liability started in the
courts when judges had to determine “whether shareholders were directly
liable for corporate debts if the [corporate] charter was silent on shareholder
liability.”21
By the mid-nineteenth century, most courts “presum[ed] limited share-
holder liability in the absence of any legislative rule.”22  Different courts had
different rationales.  Some courts, for example, reasoned that because some
corporate charters contained express statements imposing direct liability, the
absence of those statements in a charter implied an intent not to impose
such liability.23  Other courts wanted to avoid an injustice to shareholders
who were both innocent and ignorant of a corporation’s mismanagement.24
Federal courts often relied on a trust fund theory: shareholders are merely
residuary owners, reimbursed only after the corporation pays its debts;25 thus
a corporation is like a trust fund in which the capital stock is used for the
payment of corporate debts while stockholders are liable only for the amount
of capital stock they contribute.26
Around the same time, legislatures began allowing limited liability, even
for shareholders of manufacturing corporations.27  This change appears to
19 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 593; Dodd, supra note 18, at 1352.
20 Not only were legislators initially reluctant to grant corporate charters with limited
liability to manufacturing corporations, they were generally reluctant to grant any corpo-
rate charters to manufacturing corporations until 1809.  Blumberg, supra note 16, at
590–91; Dodd, supra note 18, at 1352–55.
21 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 591.
22 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1210 n.17 (quoting MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 94 (1992)).  Massachusetts courts as early as
1808 and Pennsylvania courts by 1816, for example, held that shareholders, absent an
express provision in the charter or in a statute, were not directly liable for corporate debts.
Blumberg, supra note 16, at 592.  Federal courts, by 1824, similarly recognized limited
liability for corporate shareholders as the default rule. Id.
23 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1210 n.17.
24 Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. (1 Tyng) 9, 14 (1819) (“[I]f [a stockholder] were equally
liable to each holder of the notes (which he must be if liable at all; for if the facts agreed
create a promise to one, they create a promise to all), then the most palpable injustice
would take place.  For a stockholder, wholly innocent and ignorant of the mismanage-
ment, which has brought the bank into discredit, might be ruined by reason of owning a
single share in the stock of the corporation.”).
25 Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
26 Id. at 436–37.
27 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 592.  New York and New Jersey began allowing limited
liability for shareholders of manufacturing corporations, followed in 1823 by New Hamp-
shire, Connecticut, and Maine. Id. at 593, 599–600.  Massachusetts, in 1830, and Rhode
Island, in 1847, were slower to adopt limited liability for manufacturing corporations. Id.
at 593.
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have been more driven by pragmatic factors.  In part, it was responsive to the
increasing political influence of industrialists, resulting from the rapid
growth of the manufacturing industry.28  In part, it was responsive to a
“flight-of-capital argument” that states failing to legislate limited shareholder
liability would suffer a flight of corporate capital to other states that had lim-
ited liability.29
Limited liability did not become universal in the United States, however,
until a century later.  California, for example, imposed pro rata shareholder
liability for all corporate debts and obligations until 1931.30  This pro rata
liability did not appear to cause a flight of corporate capital to other states or
otherwise impede California’s economic growth.31
2. Banks
Unlike nonbank corporations in which shareholders initially were sub-
ject to unlimited liability, bank shareholders initially were subject to (only)
double liability—liability for corporate obligations in an amount equal to the
par value of their shares.32  States imposed double liability either by express
provisions in state bank charters or in their state constitutions.33  Congress
followed the example of the states and provided for double liability in the
National Banking Act of 1863.34  According to the senator who proposed the
provision, its purpose was to provide additional protection to bank creditors
and, in effect, to also prevent the bank from engaging in excessively risky
operations.35
28 Id. at 592–93.
29 Dodd, supra note 18, at 1367–68, 1369.  There were other, lesser, factors.  In Massa-
chusetts, for example, the governor feared that unlimited liability made shares of Massa-
chusetts manufacturing corporations nearly worthless, and therefore brought financial
ruin to Massachusetts’s families. Id. at 1368.  A Massachusetts senator also argued that
unlimited liability created a moral hazard problem by enabling manufacturing corpora-
tions to obtain credit in an amount in excess of the value of their business assets. Id. at
1370.
30 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 597.
31 Id. at 599; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Share-
holder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1924 (1991) (noting that California
imposed unlimited, pro rata liability by statute on shareholders, “evidently without crip-
pling industrial and commercial development”).
32 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 36 (1992).
33 Id.
34 Id.  The National Banking Act of 1863 specifically provided that “each shareholder
shall be liable to the amount, at their par value, of the shares held by him in addition to
the amount invested in such shares.”  National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665,
668.  The senator who proposed the provision explicitly recognized that the provision
“tracked the laws of ‘most of the States of the Union.’”  Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at
36 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 824 (1863)).
35 Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 36 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1869
(1864)).
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Double liability for bank shareholders quickly fell out of favor, however,
following the Great Depression.  Several factors contributed to its rapid fall
from grace,36 including a perception of unfairness caused by liability of bank
shareholders who did not contribute to management decisions37 and public
questioning of its ability to reduce risk given the widespread bank failures.38
In response, Congress ended double liability for shareholders of national
banks and states ended double liability for shareholders of state-chartered
banks.39  Today, “double liability for bank shareholders is a dead letter
everywhere.”40
Limited liability is now the general default rule in the United States for
shareholders of banks and nonbank corporations.41  As explained below, the
United States is not alone in adopting limited liability.
3. Limited Liability’s Development in Foreign Jurisdictions
Civil law countries in Europe adopted limited liability even earlier than
the United States.42  Canada43 and England44 adopted limited liability after
the United States.
36 Id. at 37.
37 Id.  One commentator remarked that double liability “disappeared in the wake of
the Great Depression where shareholders, who were hit by the huge unanticipated losses,
pleaded with federal and state legislators to move to single liability.”  White, supra note 7,
at 8.  The public’s disgust with double liability during this time is exemplified by the popu-
lar press’s harsh criticism of the Supreme Court in 1944 for upholding an assessment of
shareholders of a holding company for the liabilities of a failed subsidiary bank.  Macey &
Miller, supra note 32, at 37–38.
38 See Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 38.
39 Id. at 38–39 (“In 1933, Congress repealed double liability for newly-issued national
bank shares; and in 1935, it prospectively extinguished all double liability for national bank
stock provided that a bank gave six months notice of termination.” (footnote omitted)); see
Blumberg, supra note 16, at 601 (noting actions by Congress and state legislatures that
ended double liability for shareholders of national and state banks).
40 Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 39.
41 According to Section 6.22 of the Model Business Corporation Act, a shareholder is
“not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b)
(2002); see Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1211 n.25 (detailing the adoption of limited liabil-
ity provisions in several states).  Most states have adopted alternative corporate forms such
as the Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) and the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP),
which also provide equity owners with limited liability for corporate debts and obligations.
See id. at 1209 n.14.  For further discussion of the development of the LLC corporate form
both in the United States and in foreign jurisdictions, see, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSI-
NESS PLANNING 64 (4th ed. 2008); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law:
The End of History or a Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 487 (2011); Marcus Lutter,
Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 2, at 4–6 (Detlev Vagts ed., 1998).
42 See Blumberg, supra note 16, at 596 (discussing France’s experience as early as 1807
with limited liability, and how limited liability then spread throughout Europe).
43 Id. at 594 (discussing Canada’s adoption of limited liability in 1850).
44 Id. at 584 (discussing England’s adoption of limited liability in 1855).
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The move towards limited liability in England is instructive.  Joint stock
associations, in which members were liable for association debts, were the
dominant form of business organization during the early nineteenth century,
because corporate charters were difficult and expensive to obtain.45  Mem-
bers attempted in various ways to limit their liability, including by inserting
the term “limited” in the association’s name.46  At least partly in response,
Parliament passed a law facilitating general incorporation but imposing
unlimited liability on shareholders with rights of contribution from fellow
shareholders.47  That law also prohibited the corporate charter from limiting
liability.48
Wealthy investors were outraged, being concerned “that creditors would
first proceed against them in preference to less wealthy members.”49  They
sparked a political debate, arguing that the law would inhibit investment.50
As a result, Parliament first enacted limited liability for investors in railways—
then one of England’s most successful and growing industries.51  That soon
led to a legislative broadening of limited liability, not only for shareholders of
new corporations generally but also for members of new and existing joint
stock associations.52  Shortly thereafter, limited liability was extended to
shareholders of banks53 and insurance companies.54
4. How History Informs the Limited Liability Debate
The historical trend towards limited liability can help to inform the
debate.  In the United States and England, the legislative trend was heavily
influenced by lobbying.  In the United States, the legislative trend was also
influenced (in a nonbank context) by fear of capital flight to other states.55
45 Id. at 581–82.
46 Id. at 582.
47 Id. at 583 (discussing the Joint Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation, and
Regulation Act, 1844).
48 Id. (observing also that the law was silent as to whether contracts with third parties
could limit shareholder liability).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 584.
52 Id. (discussing the Limited Liability Act, 1855 and the Joint Stock Companies Act,
1856).
53 Id. (discussing legislation in 1857 and 1858).
54 Id. (discussing legislation in 1862).
55 Subsequent experience suggests, however, that unlimited liability may not necessa-
rily cause capital flight. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (observing that Cali-
fornia’s pro rata liability rule did not appear to cause a flight of corporate capital to other
states); see also Blumberg, supra note 16, at 594 (“In fact, there is little sign that the differ-
ent legal rules on shareholder liability adversely affected economic development in Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island during this period.”); Dodd, supra note 18, at 1378 (“There is
some indication that the early adoption of the limited-liability principle by New Hampshire
and Connecticut stimulated the development of the cotton-textile industry in those states.
Yet both states continued to lag, as producers of cotton textiles, behind Massachusetts,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-DEC-14 17:10
2014] shadow  banking &  limited  liability 9
The judicial progression towards limited liability has more of a “fairness”
rationale: to protect innocent shareholders who are not in a “capacity to con-
trol” or influence management decisions.56  This rationale is also part of the
justification for shifting from bank-shareholder double liability to limited lia-
bility: imposing double liability on bank shareholders who did not contribute
to management decisions created a perception of unfairness.57
The shift from bank-shareholder double liability to limited liability also
reflected disappointment that double liability did not prevent the bank fail-
ures of the Great Depression.  The magnitude of the Great Depression, how-
ever, does not make it an appropriate test; its impact overwhelmed even
many prudent banks.58
The historical trend in England towards limited liability likewise can
help to inform the debate.  The turning point was opposition to unlimited
liability by wealthy investors, who feared they would become the ultimate
deep pockets for their firms’ liabilities.59  It is unclear, though, whether fully
limiting liability was the only way to remove the fear, thereby ensuring invest-
ment.  Without totally sacrificing the monitoring benefits of shareholder lia-
bility, that fear could have been mitigated by partially limiting shareholder
liability, such as to double liability or pro rata liability.60
B. The General Academic Debate
Next consider the academic debate on whether limited liability should
generally be the norm.  To that end, the discussion below reviews scholarly
challenges to limited liability made prior, and then in response, to the global
financial crisis,61 and then compares those challenges with scholarly justifica-
tions for limited liability.
which did not adopt the principle until 1830, and Rhode Island, which did not adopt it
until seventeen years later.” (footnotes omitted)).
56 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  At least some bank shareholders
were also bank insiders, however.  Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 56.
58 A positive result of the double liability regime was that it encouraged prudent bank
practices including voluntary liquidation of failing banks.  Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at
57.  Notably, however, involuntary liquidations approached the number of voluntary liqui-
dations and consolidations during the difficult years of 1929–1933. Id. at 58.
59 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60 Professor Gerding also argues that the historical trend in England towards limited
liability followed a pattern—an expansion of limited liability and liberalization of corpo-
rate law rules, followed by a financial boom, then followed by a financial bust—that pro-
ceeded like clockwork every ten years from 1825 through the nineteenth century. ERIK F.
GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 74–77 (2013).
61 By “global financial crisis,” this Article means the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
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1. Scholarly Challenges Prior to the Global Financial Crisis
Scholarly challenges to limited liability initially focused on harm caused
by corporate torts.62  The concern was that limited liability created moral
hazard63: shareholders whose liability was capped at the value of their equity
contribution would want their firms to engage in riskier—and therefore
more tort-prone—projects than is socially optimal.64
To mitigate this suboptimal risk-taking, some scholars advocated pro
rata, unlimited shareholder liability;65 others advocated a control-based lia-
bility regime.66  Under the former, shareholders would be liable for unpaid
tort judgments in proportion to their equity ownership of the firm.67  Under
the latter regime, only shareholders with a “capacity to control”68 their firms
would be liable for tort judgments.69
Scholars also challenged the limited liability of bank shareholders, argu-
ing for a return to double liability.70  Professors Macey and Miller used his-
torical data on bank failures71 to argue that banks whose shareholders are
62 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 1879–80 (briefly introducing the
existing scholarship proposing to curtail limited liability).
63 Id. at 1882.
64 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1232–33.  I have previously considered an analogous
problem—“marginalizing” risk in debt markets.  Investors follow the conventional wisdom
of risk dispersion—they diversify their investment portfolios to reduce risk.  Risk disper-
sion, however, can lead investors to both underestimate and underprotect against risk due
to market failures including information failure, model failure, human processing failure,
and collective action failure.  This “marginalization” of risk can result in harm to the actual
market participants and harm that extends beyond the market participants, such as finan-
cial crisis or systemic collapse. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 487 (2012).
65 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 1892–1909.
66 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1271–1301.
67 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 1892; see id. at 1906–09 (arguing that pro
rata liability would marginally increase shareholders’ incentives to monitor and help avoid
their firm’s risky activities).
68 A shareholder with the “capacity to control” is a shareholder with a controlling own-
ership stake in the corporation.  Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1271 n.281.  These share-
holders are uniquely positioned with low-cost access to corporate information and are
better able to influence corporate decisions. Id. at 1249–52.  Corporations that have a
shareholder with the “capacity to control” are more likely to engage in excessively risky
activities. See id. at 1258 (explaining that shareholders with the “capacity to control” are
more attracted to hazardous activities with small risk of large loss and better able to influ-
ence the corporation to engage in these activities).  Consequently, “under limited liability,
there is a set of risky activities that a company with a dispersed share ownership would not
select, but a company with a controlling shareholder would.” Id.
69 Id. at 1271; see id. at 1272–79 (detailing the logistics of a control-based liability
regime).
70 See supra text accompanying note 32.  Recall that double liability meant shareholder
liability for obligations in an amount equal to the par value of their shares.
71 Macey and Miller scrutinized the recovery rate of national bank assessments, the
liquidation of national banks, the average annual losses from national bank failures, and
bank capital ratios.  Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 55–61.
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subject to double liability may fail less frequently than banks whose share-
holders have limited liability.72  Professor Grossman, an economist, also used
historical data to conclude that double liability generally had the effect of
reducing risk-taking.73  These studies countered the dubious narrative that
because double liability failed to guarantee bank stability during the Great
Depression, it does not reduce risk-taking.74
2. Scholarly Challenges After the Global Financial Crisis
In response to the global financial crisis, scholars have revisited the lim-
ited liability debate, focusing on moral hazard as a cause of excessive risk-
taking in the financial industry.  Professor White, an economist, posits that
the crisis resulted from the “steady erosion of incentives that induced man-
agement to control risk,” including investment banks’ shift from partnerships
with unlimited liability to corporations with limited liability.75  Professors Hill
and Painter have independently made and developed similar arguments.76
Other scholars, such as Peter Conti-Brown, have echoed these arguments,
focusing on the impact of the risk-taking: shareholders protected by limited
liability can “pocket the benefits generated by [their firms’] risky activities,”
72 Id. at 32.  Immediately following the Great Depression, conventional wisdom was
that double liability failed to adequately protect bank creditors and therefore the system
needed to be replaced by deposit insurance to better protect bank creditors. See supra
notes 36–40 and accompanying text.  Macey and Miller, however, concluded that double
liability was a successful mechanism for protecting bank creditors and promoting sound
banking practices because recoveries from shareholders were good—the recovery rate dur-
ing this period was approximately fifty-one percent; banks were encouraged to privately
transfer assets before failure; banks were encouraged to more cautiously manage assets to
avoid shareholder assessment; and banks were allowed to operate with lower capital ratios.
Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 56, 61–62.
73 Richard S. Grossman, Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 143, 157 (2001) (“The effects of double liability can be seen through lower failure
rates, higher capital ratios, and higher liquidity ratios among state banks in multiple-liabil-
ity states.”).  Professor Grossman examined state-level failure data on state and national
banks, state-level balance sheet data for state and national banks, and data on individual
state and national banks in Alabama and Mississippi prior to and following the introduc-
tion of double liability in Mississippi. Id. at 147.
74 Id. at 157–58.  Grossman also examined empirical data to understand the motiva-
tions for legislating double liability or limited liability.  Richard S. Grossman, Fear and
Greed: The Evolution of Double Liability in American Banking, 1865–1930, 44 EXPLORATIONS
ECON. HIST. 59, 59 (2007).  States legislating double liability were motivated by fear; they
wanted to deter high levels of bank failures by motivating sounder banking practices. Id. at
71–75.  States legislating limited liability were motivated by greed; they wanted to
encourage growth through increased bank investment and risk-taking. Id.
75 White, supra note 7, at 2–3.  White suggests that double liability for banks reflected a
“superior alignment of liabilities and incentives for shareholders and managers so that the
risk-taking temptations of managers were controlled.” Id. at 4–6 (supporting this conclu-
sion with numerical examples to demonstrate that the system of double liability incen-
tivized shareholders, senior bank management, and directors to control and reduce risk-
taking).
76 See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
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while the costs of those risky activities is passed on to the government
through bailouts and ultimately onto taxpayers.77
These arguments effectively continue the pre-crisis observation that lim-
ited liability theoretically incentivizes risky action.78  The investment-banking
example of the shift from unlimited to limited liability also helps to concre-
tize this observation.79  Prior to 1970, investment banks were organized as
partnerships, with partners facing personal liability for the debts of their firm
if it failed.80  This restrained risk-taking.81  Following a change to the New
York Stock Exchange rules allowing brokerage firms to have publicly owned
77 Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 411–12 (2012).
Despite their seemingly unfair consequences, bailouts are in many cases necessary to pre-
vent complete financial collapse. Id. at 412.  The U.S. government, for example, bailed out
American International Group, Inc. (AIG) because of the fear that if AIG had been
allowed to fail it would have resulted in “a domino effect of failures reaching around the
world.” See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943,
978 (2009) (discussing the AIG bailout).  Conti-Brown proposes modifying limited liability
under an “elective shareholder liability” rule: firms can elect between larger capital ade-
quacy requirements or pro rata shareholder liability in the case of a bailout.  Conti-Brown,
supra, at 429–34.
78 Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Increased-Liability Equity: A Proposal to Improve Capi-
tal Regulation of Large Financial Institutions 4 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working
Paper No. 68, 2010; Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2043, 2010).
Generally, a firm’s directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders and not to creditors.  In a
limited context, however, a firm’s directors may owe a fiduciary duty to creditors—when
the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency.  There is, however, no hard and fast rule on which a
director can rely.  Therefore, it is unclear how a director should balance between protect-
ing creditors and encouraging a corporation to innovate and take appropriate business
risks.  In practice, corporations take more risks to fulfill their duty to shareholders and
ultimately shift the risk on to creditors. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
§ 3:2.1 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2006).
79 Notwithstanding this observation, some scholars have argued that debt creates
incentives that impose discipline on a firm’s managers. See Anat R. Admati et al., Liability
Holding Companies, 59 UCLA L. REV. 852, 857–58 (2012) (discussing the argument that
debt funding helps to reduce agency costs by imposing discipline on corporate managers).
Covenants are a central mechanism used by creditors for limiting a firm’s ability to take
excessive risks and monitoring a firm’s management. See generally Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 337–39 (1976); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The
Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1995).  Other
scholars have noted, however, that this is inapplicable to banks.  Admati et al., supra, at
858.  Bank debt, backed by deposit insurance and implicit government guarantees, fails to
incentivize creditors to monitor bank management because creditors expect to recover
even if the bank fails. Id.  This exacerbates the moral hazard problem because the govern-
ment and ultimately taxpayers bear the downside risks.  Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note
78, at 4.
80 Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment
Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–79 (2010).
81 Id. at 1179.
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shares, investment banks switched to the corporate form.82  Because invest-
ment bankers were now protected by limited liability, “frenetic risk-taking
[allegedly] became the norm.”83  Professors Hill and Painter liken this to
gambling with “house money,” in which the investment bankers have no per-
sonal stake.84
3. Scholarly Justifications for Limited Liability
Next compare these scholarly challenges to limited liability with the
scholarly justifications for limited liability.  The traditional scholarly justifica-
tion for limited liability is the encouragement of equity-capital investment.85
This so-called “efficiency justification”86 holds that limited liability creates
appropriate incentives for widespread investor participation in equity owner-
ship, especially in large corporations.87  Besides addressing investor risk aver-
sion,88 limited liability reduces monitoring costs: an equity investor need not
overly worry about monitoring the firm’s risky actions (for which the investor
could ultimately become liable),89 nor need an equity investor worry about
monitoring the wealth of other shareholders (for whose shareholder liability
the investor could ultimately bear under a joint-and-several shareholder lia-
bility regime, which could be especially tricky given the free transferability of
equity shares).90  Additionally, by promoting the free transfer of shares,91
82 Id. at 1181.
83 Id. at 1181–82.
84 Id. at 1183–84.  An additional consequence of limited liability is that investment
bankers are less concerned with the absolute amount of money at risk.  For example,
“[t]he possibility of a loss of $950 million of a $1 billion portfolio, having $50 million left
over, may matter less than the possibility of a loss of all but $1 million of just about any
large portfolio.” Id. at 1185.
85 Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106
HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992).
86 The moniker “efficiency justification” arose because limited liability is said to
encourage an efficient level of investment.  Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1217.
87 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 612–13.
88 See Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1218–19 (discussing arguments as to how limited
liability corrects excessive investor risk aversion).  Scholars have argued that limited liabil-
ity allows shareholders to diversify their investments and consequently encourages share-
holder risk-taking.  Under limited liability, no one investment will expose all of the
shareholder’s assets to risk.  Therefore, a shareholder can invest in a diversified portfolio
of varying risk where each investment’s ultimate risk is limited to the amount of capital
invested.  Blumberg, supra note 16, at 616; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Lim-
ited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (1985); Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 102 (1991).  In the
absence of these diversification benefits, some projects with positive net present values
would be rejected as “too risky.”  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 97.
89 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 614; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 94–95;
Ribstein, supra note 88, at 103.
90 Blumberg, supra note 16, at 614–15; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 95.
Limited liability also contributes to uniformity in share price.  Without limited liability,
investors would attach different values to shares, depending on that investor’s wealth.
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limited liability serves to create incentives for managers to act efficiently:
shareholders can transfer their shares if managers perform poorly, and the
new shareholders can install new managers.92
4. How Existing Scholarship Informs the Limited Liability Debate
The existing scholarship recognizes that limited liability can create
moral hazard, leading to excessive corporate risk-taking.  On balance,
though, limited liability encourages equity-capital investment by addressing
investor risk aversion and by reducing investor monitoring costs.  It also may
create incentives for managers to act efficiently.
The existing scholarship does not examine limited liability in the con-
text of the emerging shadow banking system.  Even the scholarship that uses
investment banks as an example does not purport to analyze how investment
banks—which can be viewed as a type of shadow bank93—might or might not
be generally representative of shadow banking firms.94  This Article next ana-
lyzes limited liability in the shadow banking context.
II. ANALYSIS
Should limited liability be the norm for the governance structure of
shadow banking?  To answer that question, this Article begins by deriving a
normative framework for rethinking the corporate governance assumptions
about limited liability.  Thereafter, the Article applies that framework to
shadow banking.
Therefore, limited liability, by removing a shareholder’s individual wealth from contempla-
tion of liability, results in homogenous shares with a single market price. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 88, at 92; Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability
in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 147 (1980).
91 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 95.  Limited liability promotes the free
transfer of shares because, as discussed supra note 90 and accompanying text, the costs of
monitoring other shareholders are reduced, simultaneously reducing the cost of transfer-
ring shares to a new shareholder.
92 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 95.  Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that
legislative-imposed limited liability is more efficient than legislative-permitted limited lia-
bility because contracting around liability would be cost prohibitive, thereby discouraging
capital investment. Id. at 93.  Accordingly, limited liability effectively “creates an efficient
contract term applicable to all transactions.”  Blumberg, supra note 16, at 615–16.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
94 Hill and Painter focus on investment banking but nonetheless define the firms they
discuss as “most firms that are federally insured banks or bank holding companies; firms
that originate, buy, or sell mortgages; firms registered as broker-dealers or investment advi-
sors under the Securities Exchange Act; and at least the larger hedge funds.”  Hill &
Painter, supra note 80, at 1190.  Although this definition would, in part, cover the shadow
banking system, their article lacks analysis as to whether investment banks might or might
not be generally representative of shadow banking firms.
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A. Deriving a Normative Framework
Any attempt to rethink assumptions relating to corporate governance
should situate that inquiry within a normative framework.  Because corporate
governance rules are a subset of financial regulation,95 that inquiry should be
situated within a financial regulatory framework.  The central purpose of
financial regulation is correcting market failures.96
Of the five general categories of market failures, three are potentially
relevant to corporate governance: information failure, agency failure, and
externalities (externalizing harm onto third parties).97  In the shadow bank-
ing system, the third market failure—externalities—becomes much more
important.  That is because the paramount concern posed by the shadow
banking system is that it “can, if left unregulated, pose systemic risks to the
financial system.”98  Systemic risks, in turn, can cause massive harm to the
real economy.99
In discussing the third market failure, I have argued, however, that
“externalities” is a misleading term because it conflates cause and effect.
Externalities are not the cause but, instead, the consequences of a failure.100
95 Cf. Corporate Governance and the New Financial Regulation: Complements or Substitutes?,
RES. NEWSL. (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Brussels, Belg.), Spring 2011 (discussing the
relationship between corporate governance and financial regulation).
96 See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE 1990S 21
(1990) (“[R]egulation can be beneficial if and only if there would otherwise be market
failure.”).  Welfare economists argue that regulation should also include the goal of maxi-
mizing social welfare. See, e.g., Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for
Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 110–11 (1979) (noting that, from the perspec-
tive of welfare economists, “it is theoretically correct to consider distributional inequity as
an example of market failure”).
97 The other two traditional market-failure categories—monopolies and other types of
non-competitive markets, and the public goods problem (a form of collective action prob-
lem describing the inability of markets to provide goods that, like clean air, are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous, since some parties will want to free ride on public goods
when such goods are (inevitably) purchased by others)—do not appear to be relevant to
corporate governance, much less to limited liability of shareholders.
98 Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 625; see also KLA´RA BAKK-SIMON ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 133, SHADOW BANKING IN THE EURO AREA: AN OVERVIEW 3
(Apr. 2012) (observing that disintermediation is “one of the main sources of financial sta-
bility concerns”).
99 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207, 235 (2008) (attempting to
estimate the costs of a systemic failure of the financial system, which could go beyond
direct economic costs and include indirect “social costs in the form of widespread poverty
and unemployment”); cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1376 n.109 (2011) (arguing
that because financial market participants are able to externalize significant social costs
associated with their risk-taking, it is in their interest to take on excessive risks and oppose
regulatory efforts to curtail, or increase the costs of, their ability to do so).
100 Economists often recognize, for example, that a market failure has occurred if the
production of goods or services results in externalities. See, e.g., Francis M. Bator, The
Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958) (defining market failure as “the
failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain ‘desirable’
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When discussing the causes of market failures, I have proposed that we substi-
tute for “externalities” the term “responsibility failure”—referring to respon-
sibility for a firm’s ability to externalize a significant portion of the costs of
taking a risky action.101  This Article will use this more precise terminology.
This Article therefore next analyzes limited liability in the shadow bank-
ing system from the standpoint of three market failures: agency failure, infor-
mation failure, and responsibility failure.  To further clarify the terminology,
references below to “limited liability” shall mean limited liability of equity
investors; references below to “equity investors” shall mean shareholders and
other persons, whether or not they own shares of stock, who share in the
firm’s profits;102 and references below to “investors” shall mean equity
investors.
B. Applying the Framework to Shadow Banking
1. Limited Liability and Agency Failure
Agency failure refers to conflicts of interest between principals and their
agents—in our case, between a firm and its investors on the one hand and
the firm’s managers on the other hand.103  Examples would include conflicts
between investors of a firm and the firm’s officers and directors.  This market
activities or to estop ‘undesirable’ activities”).  The cause of the market failure is not exter-
nalities per se, however; rather, it is the problem with the production of goods and services
that resulted in the externalities.  The externalities merely signal that a market failure has
occurred. Cf. Mark Sunshine, How Did Economists Blow It (Part 2)? – They Missed the Negative
Externalities of America’s Limited Liability Society, SUNSHINE REP. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www
.thesunshinereport.net/marksunshine/?p=402 (arguing that although economic “theories
about efficient markets and logical behavior are pretty good, the fundamental application
of these theories stinks”).
101 Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1799–1800.  Referring to externalities as a type of market
failure is also misleading because externalities cannot be considered a truly distinct type of
market failure; all types of market failures can result in externalities.  Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
& Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 558, 561
(1999); cf. ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 167–69 (1994) (“[I]f
externality is simply another word for market failure, or institutional failure . . . the notion
of externality becomes redundant.”).  To avoid this circularity, some economists have even
questioned whether “externalities” should denote a separate market-failure category. See,
e.g., PAPANDREOU, supra, at 99–100 (arguing that the “non-existence of markets” is the
actual market failure referred to as “externalities” and that it is “not useful to treat exter-
nalities as a subset of market failure, nor for that matter as a cause of market failure”);
Zerbe & McCurdy, supra, at 562 (arguing that externalities should not be defined as mar-
ket failures); cf. id. at 564 (arguing that “a close examination of the market failure concept
gives rise to all sorts of definitional problems” related to externalities).
102 This might include, for example, a manager who has a bonus-compensation scheme
based on the firm’s profits.
103 Because it is not a principal-agent conflict, agency failure does not include the con-
flict in which investor-managers have strong incentives to take risks that could generate
outsized profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.
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failure does not appear to be directly relevant to analyzing the limited liabil-
ity of investors.104
2. Limited Liability and Information Failure
Information failure refers to asymmetric information, or even mutual
misinformation, between parties.  An example of the former would be the
insufficiency of disclosure to completely inform investors of the merits and
risks of a highly complex securities investment.105  Information failure can
arise from various causes, including the potential for transaction costs relat-
ing to information acquisition to diminish the incentive to acquire such
information.106
This market failure is directly relevant to limited liability.  If investors
stand only to lose their equity investments in a firm, they will have limited
incentives to incur costs monitoring the firm.  I next argue, however, that
monitoring incentives will be even more limited for investors of shadow
banking firms.  Among other reasons, it is because those investors may not
bear all of the adverse consequences of such limited monitoring.107  Increas-
ing investor liability can help to increase those monitoring incentives.
That does not fully address, however, the design of the monitoring
incentives.  Ideally, increasing investor liability should encourage not only
monitoring of the firm, qua firm; it also should encourage monitoring of the
firm’s potential to trigger systemic risk, thereby externalizing risk.  I next
address that concern.
3. Limited Liability and Responsibility Failure
In the shadow banking system, limited liability is an important source of
responsibility failure that can lead to externalities—and, even more signifi-
104 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 8.  This market failure may be indirectly relevant
to limited liability.  For example, the greater the investor liability, the greater the incentive
of investors to align managers to their interests.
105 See Lee C. Buchheit, Did We Make Things Too Complicated?, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 24,
26 (2008) (noting that “[c]omplexity can obscure the risks of [financial] transaction[s]”);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
1109, 1110 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure] (noting that the prospectus in a
securities offering is often hundreds of pages long); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Com-
plexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 214–15 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Regulating Complexity]; cf. John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A Review of Recent Derivatives
Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 74 (2011) (observing that court records reveal
investors’ misunderstandings about the nature of derivative financial instruments).
106 See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 395–405 (1980); Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure,
supra note 105, at 1113–15; cf. Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 504 (observing that when numer-
ous investors have rights in a class of securities, investors individually might lack a sufficient
amount at risk to motivate monitoring).
107 See infra notes 121–31 and accompanying text (explaining why investors of shadow
banking firms will not bear all of the adverse consequences of a systemic collapse).
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cantly, to systemic externalities.108  If a shadow banking firm cannot pay all of
the externalized harm for which it becomes liable, the firm’s investors will
not (qua investors) be financially responsible beyond the capital they have
invested.  To that extent, limited liability creates moral hazard.109
Admittedly, limited liability creates moral hazard even outside the
shadow banking system.  It is widely understood, for example, that “most of a
corporate structure’s externalities result from the limited-liability rule of cor-
poration law.”110  Moral hazard in shadow banking, however, is more likely to
have systemic consequences.  There are two reasons why: decentralization
makes managers of limited liability shadow banking firms more likely to take
risks than managers of other limited liability firms, thereby making shadow
banking firms more likely to fail; and disintermediation makes the conse-
quences of a shadow banking firm’s failure more likely to be systemic than
the consequences of an ordinary firm’s failure.
First consider why decentralization makes managers of limited liability
shadow banking firms more likely to take risks than managers of other lim-
ited liability firms.  The relatively small firms, such as hedge funds, that oper-
ate in the shadow banking system are often managed directly by their
primary investors.111  Because such investor-managers typically are entitled to
a significant share of their firm’s profits,112 they have strong incentives to
take risks that could generate large profits.113  Some risks might even poten-
108 Cf. Edouard Challe et al., Equilibrium Risk Shifting and Interest Rate in an Opaque
Financial System, ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE, CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE,
Sept. 2012, at 6, available at http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/72/89/28/PDF/
2012-19.pdf (noting that systemic risk arises partially because limited liability increases
intermediaries’ risk tolerance).
109 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing limited liability and moral
hazard).
110 Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form
and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 144 (2004).
111 See Stacy Preston Collins, Valuation of Hedge Fund Businesses, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
L. 389, 397 (2008) (noting that hedge fund managers often have to commit a significant
amount of their own capital); Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Sub-
prime Crisis, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 236 (2009) (noting that managers of small banks and
thrifts can own a large share of their firms’ equity).
112 See, e.g., Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment Company Act
as a Regulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 288 (2008) (noting that hedge fund
managers often receive the right to twenty percent of the funds’ performance that exceeds
a minimum “performance floor”); Economic Analysis of the Split of Profits Between Hedge Fund
Investors and Hedge Fund Management by Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERA-
TION AND DEV. 6, http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxadministration/18474849.pdf (last visited
Oct. 10, 2014) (noting that, during the period 1998 to 2002, hedge fund managers gener-
ally received around twenty percent of their funds’ profits).
113 Consider, for example, William Ackman’s recent failed bet on J.C. Penney.  Ackman
is founder and CEO of the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management, LP. See
William Ackman, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/william-ackman/ (last visited
Oct. 10, 2014).  In October 2010, Ackman disclosed that Pershing Square had acquired a
16.5 percent stake in the then struggling J.C. Penney Co. See Maxwell Murphy, How Bill
Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
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tially generate such outsized profits that investor-managers would gain life-
time financial security.114  Yet if a risky action exposes their firm to
significant liability for externalized harm, limited liability protects those
investor-managers from losing more than their invested capital.
This is radically unlike the management incentives in non-shadow bank-
ing firms.  In those firms (such as ordinary business corporations and even
traditional banks), senior managers tend to share only indirectly in profits,
such as through stock options.  Most profits ordinarily are paid to non-man-
ager investors.115  Furthermore, managers are often invested in maintaining
their jobs.116  They are therefore much less motivated to take actions that
risk the firm, such as exposing the firm to significant liability for externalized
harm.117
Managers of limited liability shadow banking firms are thus more likely
to take risks than managers of other limited liability firms, thereby making
shadow banking firms more likely to fail.118  That likelihood of failure is fur-
deals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ackman-stalked-jc-penney/.  At the time, Ackman was betting
that he could transform J.C. Penney, an extremely risky venture that was met with signifi-
cant skepticism. Id.  The total cost of Ackman’s bet on J.C. Penney would eventually total
$1 billion and include him taking a seat on the J.C. Penney board.  Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Bad
JC Penney Bet Calls Ackman’s Retail Acumen into Question, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2013), http://
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE97C0ZI20130813.  In August 2013, Ackman
accepted that his bet was a mistake. Id.  He resigned from the J.C. Penney board and sold
his investment in J.C. Penney generating a loss of more than $600 million.  James
Sterngold, Ackman’s Pershing Square Takes $1.2 Billion Hit, WALL ST. J., (Oct 4, 2013, 2:02
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230372260457911366161649
1516.  This risky bet on J.C. Penney combined with another failed risky bet on Herbalife
Ltd. has led to a decline in the assets under Pershing Square’s management of $1.2 billion,
which is approximately ten percent. Id.
114 Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549,
562–63 (2009) (discussing how “super-large compensation” can skew incentives).
115 See, e.g., Robert Boldin & Keith Leggett, Bank Dividend Policy as a Signal of Bank
Quality, 4 FIN. SERVICES REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that industry-wide bank payout ratios on
stock have reached eighty percent); Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report:
Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRI-
SIS 2009, at 319, 379 (2009) (describing how Basel III might reduce long-term bank stock-
dividend payout ratios from sixty percent, pre-crash, to forty percent).
116 Cf. Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (2002)
(describing how managers who do not own a substantial portion of the firm may be better
agents for lenders’ interests because of “managers’ desire to keep their jobs, which
depends on the firm’s continuing financial viability”).
117 Cf. Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 320 (1990) (“[In a traditional firm] [t]he manager cannot take as
cavalier an attitude toward the diversifiable risks of his corporation as the stockholder can.
If a corporation does badly because a new investment project fails, a manager must rely
primarily on other projects undertaken by the same corporation to balance against it.  His
salary and prospects and his value to a potential new employer would be hurt by poor firm
performance.”).
118 Shadow banking firms are also more likely to fail than traditional banks because
they are not subject to the type of solvency/prudential regulation imposed on traditional
banks, see infra note 124, and also because shadow banking firms are not limited in their
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ther increased by the fact that shadow banking financial intermediation, like
traditional bank financial intermediation, often involves the short-term fund-
ing of long-term projects.119  This creates a liquidity risk that the short-term
debt cannot be rolled over.  A failure to roll over (i.e., refinance) short-term
debt could result in the firm’s default.120
The consequences of a shadow banking firm’s failure are also more
likely to be systemic than the consequences of an ordinary firm’s failure.
Like traditional banks, shadow banking firms engage in financial intermedia-
tion on which the real economy is dependent.  Because all financial
intermediaries—including shadow banking firms and traditional banks—
tend to be highly interconnected, the failure of a shadow banking firm could
trigger the failures of other financial intermediaries.121  Such a chain of fail-
ures would be the epitome of a systemic event, especially if it materially
reduces the availability of financial intermediation.122
Additionally, the aforesaid short-term funding of long-term projects not
only increases the likelihood of a shadow banking firm’s failure123 but can
increase the systemic consequences of that failure.  Among other reasons, an
event that prevents one shadow banking firm from refinancing can also pre-
vent—or can be correlated to other events that also prevent—other shadow
banking firms from refinancing.  Because shadow banking does not (at least
currently) require the type of solvency/prudential regulation imposed on
traditional banks,124 such a correlated failure would be highly systemically
activities to financial intermediation so they can also take other types of business risks. See
Andrew Crockett & Benjamin H. Cohen, Financial Markets and Systemic Risk in an Era of
Innovation, 4 INT’L FIN. 127, 137–38 (2001) (discussing that the expanded range of activity
by financial institutions has increased “the exposure of institutions to [market] shocks” and
also observing that the wider range of markets in which financial institutions are engaged
has increased the “number of potential channels of propagation of shocks”).
119 SIVs, for example, issue short-term commercial paper to fund long-term projects.
See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1805.  Money-market mutual funds also provide short-term
loans to fund long-term projects. Id.  Admittedly, the traditional business of banking also
uses short-term borrowing from depositors to finance long-term loans to bank customers.
Id. at 1806.  However, the potential systemic externalities are offset by prudential regula-
tion and deposit insurance. See infra note 124.
120 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1806.
121 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 1355 (“The financial system is comprised
of institutions that are highly interrelated.  In this sense, it is a ‘network.’” (citing Markus
K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
77, 96 (2009))); see also id. at 1356–61 (explaining how inter-institution correlation, or
interconnectedness, helps to explain why certain failures become systemic and others, like
Enron’s failure, do not).
122 See Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 204.
123 See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
124 In bank-intermediated finance, systemic externalities, specifically bank runs, are
mitigated by prudential regulation and deposit insurance. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at
1810–11.  In contrast, prudential regulation does not or cannot be applied to many shadow
banking firms. Id. at 1811–15.  Meanwhile, disintermediation by spurring the short-term
funding of long-term projects can mimic the effects of a bank run. Id. at 1807–08.  Section
113 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act empowers the
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risky.  Economists have identified the failure of shadow banking firms to roll
over short-term debt as a contributing factor to the global financial crisis.125
In summary, although the limited liability of firms can always cause
externalities, the limited liability of shadow banking firms is much more
likely than the limited liability of non-shadow banking firms to cause systemic
externalities.  This is certainly a quantitative distinction: systemic externalities
can cause much more harm than non-systemic externalities.126  I next argue
that this is also a qualitative distinction.
An important function of law, and in particular tort law, is to operate as
a mechanism for internalizing a firm’s externalities.  By empowering injured
third parties to sue a firm for harm, tort law helps to internalize a firm’s
externalities because the firm will either pay the cost of the externalities ex
post through a judgment or will not engage in the activity ex ante to avoid
the potential costs of an adverse judgment.  Still, limited liability has practical
consequences for traditional banking firms: third parties injured by even
non-systemic harm are not always able to recover damages that perfectly
internalize the harm because the firm causing the harm may have insufficient
capital to pay the damages.127
The consequences of limited liability for shadow banking firms, how-
ever, are qualitatively different: third parties injured by systemic harm will
have virtually no chance to recover damages that internalize the harm.
Although this difference arises partly because shadow banking firms are
unlikely to have sufficient capital to pay for the massive and widespread harm
caused by a systemic collapse,128 the conceptual reason for the difference is
legal.  As explained below, existing law does not—and adaptations to tradi-
tional law are unlikely to—effectively internalize that harm.
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate nonbank financial institutions as
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and therefore subject them to consoli-
dated supervision by the Federal Reserve and enhanced prudential standards.  Notably, as
of this writing, only three firms have been designated as SIFIs by the FSOC. Designations,
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designa-
tions/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 17, 2013, 3:47 PM) (listing designated SIFIs as
only American International Group, Inc., General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc., and
Prudential Financial, Inc.).
125 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1807–08 (discussing the findings of economists Gary
Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Federal Reserve Board economists, and the European Cen-
tral Bank).
126 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
127 Cf. supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly arguments that
limited liability generally encourages firms to engage in riskier, and therefore more tort-
prone, projects than is socially optimal).  Third parties injured by non-systemic harm, spe-
cifically tort victims, might not always be able to recover damages. Cf. Hansmann & Kraak-
man, supra note 31, at 1881 (“Already, strong empirical evidence indicates that increasing
exposure to tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to
exploit limited liability to evade damage claims.”).
128 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 206 (discussing the extent and magnitude of that
harm).
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As mentioned, tort law operates as a mechanism for internalizing a
firm’s externalities.  To win their lawsuits, injured third parties normally must
show their harm to be a causal129 and foreseeable130 consequence of the
firm’s actions.  Third parties injured by systemic harm caused by the firm’s
actions would unlikely be able to show that, however.  Systemic harm can
affect a wide range of third parties in unpredictable ways, such as an individ-
ual who is forced to close her family-owned restaurant during a systemically
caused recession.  Nor is it likely that changing the causation-and-foreseeabil-
ity standard to enable third parties to win those lawsuits would be an efficient
solution.131  At the very least, courts would face a line-drawing problem and
would be forced to make complicated decisions as to what systemic externali-
ties should (or should not) be considered compensable.
The analysis has shown that limited liability investors of shadow banking
firms lack sufficient monitoring incentives to avoid engaging in systemically
risky actions, and that adaptations to traditional legal remedies are unlikely
to adequately internalize systemic externalities.  I next examine whether
redesigning limited liability could be a more efficient solution to this
problem.132
III. REDESIGNING LIMITED LIABILITY
Because it increases responsibility failure in the shadow banking system,
limited liability should be redesigned if the benefits of the redesign outweigh
the costs.  This Part examines how that might be done.
129 Under the “but-for” test of causation, “causation exists only when the result would
not have occurred without the party’s conduct.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at
228.
130 Foreseeability is an element of proximate cause in tort law, defined as “[t]he quality
of being reasonably anticipatable.” Id. at 250, 721.  Civil damages are normally imposed
only for foreseeable harms.  Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom-to-Failure Cycle,
62 DUKE L.J. 767, 789 (2012).
131 In theory, civil damages can be imposed under existing law for all harms, regardless
of foreseeability, pursuant to the allocation-of-resources justification of enterprise liability.
See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
529 (1961).  The rationale for enterprise liability is that prices should reflect the “actual
costs” of goods so as to allow purchasers to make informed decisions. Id. at 502.  There-
fore, “the cost of injuries should be borne by the activities which caused them,” regardless
of fault, because injuries represent a “real cost” of those activities. Id. at 505.  Foreseeabil-
ity is irrelevant under enterprise liability because unforeseeable harms are “just as truly
costs” of doing business as foreseeable harms. Id. at 529.
132 Other possible non-traditional legal solutions, such as regulation directed at ensur-
ing shadow banking firm solvency, are beyond the scope of this article. Cf. POSNER, supra
note 9, at 413–14 (stating that “it is arguable that the government should take a more
active role in assuring the solvency of corporations” to mitigate externalities caused by
corporate limited liability, and observing that “the regime in banking . . . and in European
corporate law” uses “continuous regulatory scrutiny of the corporation by an administrative
agency”).
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A. Setting Goals for Redesigning Limited Liability
Any redesign of limited liability should at least take into account its tradi-
tional justifications.  The goal of the “efficiency” justification is to create
incentives for widespread investor participation in equity ownership.133
Investors have risk aversion;134 the more risk they are exposed to, the less
incentive they will have to invest.  Even fully rational investors will refuse to
invest if their risk is unlimited, because the expected value of their losses
might well exceed the expected value of their gains.135
Therefore, any redesign of limited liability should attempt not only to
minimize investor risk aversion but also to make investors comfortable that
the expected value of their potential gains should exceed (by a sufficient
margin to encourage investment) the expected value of their potential
losses.136  The most effective way to accomplish that would be to set some
type of cap or limit—such as double liability, which a recent study suggests is
a “superior alignment of liabilities and incentives”137—on the potential
liability.
Another traditional justification for limited liability is that it reduces
monitoring costs because an investor need not overly worry about monitor-
ing the firm’s risky actions, for which the investor could ultimately become
liable.138  In the shadow banking system, this justification should be given
less weight because the potential for shadow banking firms to trigger systemic
risk may well justify, if not necessitate, increased monitoring.
A related monitoring-cost justification for limited liability is that an
investor need not worry about monitoring the wealth of other investors,
whose liability the investor could ultimately bear under a joint-and-several
liability regime.139  This risk—including the complications it entails due to
the free transferability of equity shares—could be avoided by a redesign, such
as double liability, in which any given investor’s liability would be indepen-
dent of the liability of other investors.
Yet another traditional justification for limited liability is that by promot-
ing the free transfer of shares, it serves to create incentives for managers to
act efficiently: investors can transfer their shares if managers perform poorly,
133 See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
134 Persons seeking gain tend to be risk averse. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent
Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (1999).
135 But cf. Conti-Brown, supra note 77, at 414, 446 (arguing that the successful opera-
tion of investment banks as partnerships until late in the twentieth century suggests that
limited liability may not be needed).
136 A related justification for limited liability was that as corporations increase in size,
there are more associated risks, and the risks are consequently of much larger scale, which
can serve to discourage investment by all but the wealthiest of investors.  Blumberg, supra
note 16, at 612–13.  Shadow banking firms, however, tend to be relatively smaller.
137 See White, supra note 7, at 4.
138 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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and the new investors can install new managers.140  This justification does
not appear to be compelling.141  Even existing investors could choose to vote
out existing managers.
The final traditional justification for limited liability turns on fairness:
that imposing additional liability on investors who did not contribute to man-
agement decisions created a perception of unfairness.142  If, however, such
liability is imposed only on investor-managers, which is this Article’s shadow
banking focus—and perhaps only on investor-managers with the power to
“control” the firm—then it should be more consistent with the fairness justifi-
cation.143  Moreover, imposing such liability on only those investors would be
efficient insofar as it ties the increase in liability to control over risk-taking
decisions.144
In sum, any redesign of limited liability in the shadow banking system
should have at least the following goals: (i) it should increase such liability in
a way that increases investor incentives to monitor (and guard against) the
140 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
141 This justification may make even less sense for shadow banking firms, like hedge
funds, that are closely held.  Some argue that limited liability is not efficient for small,
closely held corporations.  Halpern et al., supra note 90, at 148.  Their rationale includes
the argument that this limited liability then introduces more aggregate costs than in large,
publicly traded corporations and also incentivizes shifting risk to parties less capable of
bearing it, such as involuntary and trade creditors. See Judith Freedman, Limited Liability:
Large Company Theory and Small Firms, 63 MOD. L. REV. 317, 332–35 (2000).
142 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing this liability in the context
of double liability of bank shareholders).  It may well be appropriate to consider fairness as
a normative goal. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 1015 (2001) (arguing that it is appropriate to consider distributional fairness
in making a policy decision).
143 Investor-manager liability may also have indirect benefits.  For example, limited lia-
bility might undermine—and thus increasing liability might support—the business judg-
ment rule and the policies behind the rule, such as keeping courts from judging business
decisions through hindsight-biased lenses, and allowing managers to take the risks neces-
sary for maximizing investor value. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009) (stating that doctrines such as the business judgment
rule “properly focus on the decision-making process rather than on the substantive evalua-
tion of the merits of the decision” to counteract the hindsight bias that some courts
exhibit); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Con-
straints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1433, 1440–41, 1449 n.56 (2010) (stating that “managers often must take reasona-
ble risks” in the ordinary course of business and arguing that hindsight bias can have a
significant influence on whether risks taken are viewed as reasonable or excessive); cf. John
Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35
(2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307959 (argu-
ing that the business judgment rule protection, which makes sense for officers and direc-
tors of a non-financial firm, leads to excessive risk-taking in a systemically important
financial firm, and proposing officer and director liability rules to counter that risk-
taking).
144 Cf. Erik Gerding, United States of America, in DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR COR-
PORATE FAULT 301, 324–25 (Helen Anderson ed., 2008) (discussing the economics of
imposing liability on officers and directors).
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firm’s potential to trigger systemic risk; (ii) it should minimize investor risk
aversion and encourage investment by setting a cap on liability sufficient to
make investors comfortable that the expected value of their potential gains
should exceed, by a sufficient margin, the expected value of their potential
losses; (iii) it should discourage cross-investor monitoring by ensuring that
any given investor’s liability is independent of the liability of other investors;
and (iv) to ensure fairness and maintain efficiency, it should increase liability
only for investor-managers (because it is that dual nature that creates the real
risk).
Because certain of these goals are in tension, no possible redesign of
limited liability could ever perfectly achieve all of these aims.  For example,
the greater the investor liability, the more investment would be discour-
aged.145  Any redesign would also have to confront the collective action prob-
lem of cross-border capital flight.  I have already discussed how increasing
investor liability might trigger capital flight between states.146  Domestically,
increasing investor-manager liability under federal law, as opposed to state
law, could solve that problem.147  The collective action problem could also
arise internationally, however.  If one or more nations increases investor lia-
bility, investors may decide to move their money to firms in other nations,
creating an international collective action problem.  Cross-border coopera-
tion would be needed to help mitigate that problem.148
Finally, in furthering the first of these goals—increasing investor incen-
tives to monitor and guard against systemic risk—this Article does not claim
145 Cf. White, supra note 7, at 8 (observing a “potential trade-off” insofar as modifying
limited liability might “create[ ] an incentive that induce[s] [bank] shareholders to act
more cautiously, reining in managers’ efforts to expand loans that contributed to the
growth of the economy”).  Another potential concern is that increasing investor liability
could make equity investments even more relatively expensive than debt, thereby increas-
ing leverage.  Although that is a theoretical concern, so many other considerations go into
the determination of a firm’s capital structure that I do not believe it is likely to become a
practical concern (and if it ever becomes a practical concern, that concern could be
addressed through the issuance of non-voting equity).
146 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
147 Federal law constitutionally allows piercing of the corporate veil to impose control-
person liability in furtherance of federal statutory policies. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act’s (ERISA) imposition of plan-termination liability jointly and
severally on the plan sponsor and all members of its control group is not an unconstitu-
tional denial of due process).
148 The Basel Capital Accords exemplify global rules intended to help avoid prejudic-
ing the competitiveness of firms—in this case, banks—in any given nation or region. See,
e.g., Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 254–56 (2012) (discussing the
Basel III capital and liquidity framework and its emphasis on consistent global standards);
Clyde Stoltenberg et al., The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in the U.S. and EU Capital
Market Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests Toward International Harmonization with
Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 577, 615–44 (2011) (examining U.S. and
E.U. efforts to adopt harmonized financial standards).
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that systemic risk could be eliminated.149  Nonetheless, that goal is important
because systemic externalities are the externalities most likely to cause wide-
spread and serious harm.150
B. Testing Redesign Proposals Against the Goals
This Article does not purport to test all possible proposals to redesign
limited liability against the foregoing goals.  Consider in the context of the
shadow banking system, however, the generalized proposals referenced ear-
lier.151  Professors Hill and Painter propose using compensation as the test,
imposing personal liability on investors that earn over a threshold number
(such as $3 million annually).152  A purely compensation-based test has the
drawback, however, that it does not target only investor-managers.  Addition-
ally, a compensation-based test might be able to be manipulated by creatively
structuring compensation in ways that avoid the test.153  Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman propose the use of pro rata, unlimited investor
liability, under which investors would be liable in proportion to their invest-
ment.154  Their proposal has two drawbacks: it may discourage investment
because it does not set a cap on liability, and it does not target only investor-
managers.  Professor Mendelson proposes the use of a control-based liability
regime under which only investors with the “capacity to control” would be
liable.155  This proposal should be superior to pro rata, unlimited investor
liability because it better aligns the costs of risky activities with control.  In a
pro rata regime a controlling investor-manager’s liability is limited by his
share of corporate equity and not his actual influence on risky activities.156
149 For analysis of the limits of law to control systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 829–33 (dis-
cussing requiring banks and systemically important nonbanks to pay for a systemic risk
protection fund in order to help to internalize the most harmful externalities of the
shadow banking system while stabilizing systemically important firms and markets); Viral V.
Acharya et al., A Tax on Systemic Risk, N.Y.U. STERN, THE VOLATILITY INST. 2–4 (Feb. 3,
2010), http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/public/static/SR-tax-nber.pdf (arguing that each institu-
tion should be required to pay a “tax” that is calculated according to the extent to which
that institution is likely to contribute to systemic risk).  Indeed, the law generally does not
require that all externalities be internalized. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20 (1993) (asking what types of externalities the law should
require to be internalized).
150 Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 206.
151 Those proposals are generalized insofar as they are not designed specifically for the
shadow banking system.  They nonetheless are worth testing because they reflect the seri-
ous thoughts of respected scholars on limited liability generally. See, e.g., Hill & Painter,
supra note 80.
152 See id. at 1188.
153 It also is unclear how Hill and Painter’s proposal addresses risk aversion; they do
not specify whether investor liability should be subject to any cap. See id.
154 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
156 By the same logic that investors with the “capacity to control” can use their unique
position to induce the corporation to engage in excessively risky activities, these investors
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However, Mendelson’s proposal may discourage investment because it does
not set a cap on liability.
Furthermore, a drawback to all of these referenced proposals is that they
fail to effectively address systemic risk.157  Any redesign of limited liability
must resolve the dilemma that investor-managers would have relatively little
incentive to monitor and guard against their firm’s potential to trigger sys-
temic risk if, as argued, tort law bars third parties injured by systemic harm
from recovering damages.158
A possible solution to this dilemma would be to couple any increase in
limited liability with a privatized systemic risk fund—which would be used to
mitigate systemic harm159—into which systemically risky shadow banking
firms would be required to contribute.160  Privatizing the funding would help
to reduce a shadow banking firm’s incentive to create systemic externalities
by engaging in financially risky activities;161 indeed, the likelihood that firms
will have to make additional contributions to the fund to replenish bailout
monies should motivate them to monitor each other and help control each
other’s risky behavior.162  Making investor-managers personally liable, sub-
ject to a cap, for shortfalls in their firm’s fund contributions would likewise
motivate them to monitor and help control their firm’s systemically risky
behavior.163
can also use their unique position to limit firm risk. See Mendelson, supra note 16, at
1280–85.
157 Indeed, it is the inherently systemically risky nature of shadow banking that limits
this Article’s recommendations to the shadow banking sector.  I am not suggesting, for
example, that limited liability be changed for operating companies that do not engage in
financial intermediation, even if such companies are run by dominant shareholders.  The
consequences of such a company’s failure are not likely to be systemic, and—all things
being equal—the tort system is more likely to enable injured third parties to recover from
the company, thereby helping to internalize the cost of the failure.
158 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.  Because there is always some risk of
losing a lawsuit, investor-managers should have some incentive, albeit limited, to monitor
and guard against their firm’s potential to trigger systemic risk.
159 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 149, at 829–30.
160 Id. (discussing, among other things, how a privatized systemic risk fund could assess
which firms are systemically risky and how much each such systemically risky firm should
be required to contribute).
161 Id. at 830.
162 Id. at 830–31.  Because their own funds would be at risk, for example, fund contrib-
utors would have incentives to inform regulators when other firms take unwise risks.  Jef-
frey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 155–56 (2011) (call-
ing for a systemic emergency insurance fund that is funded by the financial industry).  If
the required contributions to the fund were risk-adjusted, fund contributors would also
have incentives to report firms that are underpaying.  Schwarcz, supra note 149, at 831.
163 Any redesign should attempt to take into account, however, the fairness of making
investor-managers of a firm personally liable for that firm’s additional fund contributions
necessitated by systemic harm caused by other firms.
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CONCLUSION
We tend not to focus on liability limitation at the firm level, simply
accepting it as a fact of life.  Limited liability is not always optimal, however,
for firms that make up the shadow banking system.  It motivates investor-
managers of those firms to take risks that could generate outsized personal
profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.
The law does not effectively mitigate these systemic externalities.  Tort
law, for example, traditionally helps to mitigate non-systemic externalities
resulting from limited liability by empowering injured third parties to sue for
harm that is a causal and foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor’s actions.
Systemic harm, however, affects a wide range of third parties in unpredict-
able ways; it is neither directly causal nor clearly foreseeable.
To mitigate systemic externalities, limited liability should be redesigned,
as explained in this Article, for investor-managers of shadow banking firms.
Any such redesign must balance the need to increase liability sufficiently to
reduce systemic risk with not discouraging investment.  The redesign should
also minimize costs by discouraging the need to engage in cross-investor
monitoring.  These competing goals may well be achievable by restricting the
increased liability to a capped multiple of the original investment, such as
double liability.
Regardless of how limited liability is redesigned, it faces the dilemma
that investor-managers would have relatively little incentive to monitor and
guard against their firm’s potential to trigger systemic risk if, as indicated,
tort law bars injured parties from recovering damages.  A possible solution to
this dilemma would be to couple the redesigned limited liability with a priva-
tized systemic risk fund—which would be used to mitigate systemic harm—
into which systemically risky shadow banking firms would be required to con-
tribute.  If an investor-manager’s firm had insufficient capital to make these
contributions, the investor-managers would become personally liable for at
least a portion of the insufficiency, thereby motivating them to monitor and
help control their firm’s systemically risky behavior.
An ultimate question for any redesign of limited liability is empirical: will
its benefits exceed its costs?  The answer to that question will depend on the
actual mechanics of the redesign, and their real-world impact on risk-taking
and investment.  Annex I below sets forth practical considerations that are
likely to be relevant to any such cost-benefit determination.
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ANNEX I
Guidance on Redesigning Limited Liability
This Annex provides practical guidance on redesigning limited liability,
including guidance for assessing costs and benefits.  Such guidance is quali-
fied by, and intended to be interpreted by reference to, the more complete
analysis in the Article itself.
1. Limited liability should be increased only for investor-managers of
firms that operate in the shadow banking system.  Because the parameters of
shadow banking are not yet well defined,164 the redesign should take into
account how to delimit those firms.  Because the primary goal of increasing
limited liability is to reduce systemic risk,165 shadow banking firms desig-
nated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) under the Dodd-
Frank Act166 should at least be included in the redesign of limited liability.
Other shadow banking firms should be considered for inclusion, however.
Being relatively small, many shadow banking firms might avoid SIFI designa-
tion; nonetheless, they could be systemically important if, for example, their
solvency or liquidity is highly correlated with that of other shadow banking
firms.
2. The term “investor-managers” means equity investors who also have
significant power to control the firm’s actions.167  To minimize discouraging
investment, the redesign should apply only to the subset of those equity inves-
tors who are entitled to a significant share of their firm’s profits, since they
are the ones who have strong incentives to take risks with their firms.168
3. Limited liability should be increased sufficiently to motivate investor-
managers to monitor and guard against systemic risk.  This could be done by
increasing such liability to a multiple of the original investment, discussed
below.
4. Any such increase in limited liability should be constrained so as not
to unduly discourage investment.169  This could be done by setting a cap on
liability, such as restricting liability to a small multiple of the original invest-
ment.  Recent scholarship suggests that double liability might represent a
good balance.170  What actually represents a good balance—e.g., a multiple
of two (double liability), or less than two (e.g., 1–1/2 liability), or more than
two—will ultimately be an empirical question.
5. Any increase in limited liability should minimize costs by discourag-
ing the need to engage in cross-investor monitoring.171  Increasing such lia-
bility to a multiple of the original investment (such as double liability) would
164 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 97–99, 108–26 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 124.
167 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 90, 139 and accompanying text.
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satisfy this requirement because any given investor-manager’s liability would
be independent of the liability of other investors.
6. Because the law does not currently have an effective mechanism to
internalize systemic externalities,172 an increase in limited liability would not,
by itself, necessarily expose investor-managers to systemic costs for which they
should be responsible.  To mitigate systemic risk-taking, any increase in lim-
ited liability should be coupled with a mechanism to internalize those costs.
One such mechanism could be a privatized systemic risk fund into which
systemically risky shadow banking firms would be required to contribute.
Investor-managers would thus be liable, up to their liability cap, for their
firm’s insufficiency in making contributions.173  Creating and maintaining
such a fund would have its own costs and political considerations.
7. To solve the collective action problem of cross-border capital flight
(i.e., that increasing liability in any given jurisdiction could drive investors to
firms in other jurisdictions)—or at least the fear of capital flight174—federal
law, rather than state law, could be used to increase limited liability in the
United States.175  Some form of cross-border cooperation would be needed,
however, to help mitigate the problem of international capital flight.176
172 See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 55, 145–48 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
